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ABSTRACT
Statistical model selection using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and similar criteria is a useful tool for comparing multiple and
non-nested models without the specification of a null model, which has
made it increasingly popular in the natural and social sciences. De-
spite their common usage, model selection methods are not driven by a
notion of statistical confidence, so their results entail an unknown de-
gree of uncertainty. This paper introduces a general framework which
extends notions of Type-I and Type-II error to model selection. A theo-
retical method for controlling Type-I error using Difference of Goodness
of Fit (DGOF) distributions is given, along with a bootstrap approach
that approximates the procedure. Results are presented for simulated
experiments using normal distributions, random walk models, nested
linear regression, and nonnested regression including nonlinear mod-
els. Tests are performed using an R package developed by the author
which will be made publicly available on journal publication of research
results.
vi
1 Introduction
The merits of hypothesis testing are many; it is well suited to making
inferences about associative, and in certain situations causal, relation-
ships between observable quantities. The use of known distributions in
testing allows for analytic solutions for the construction of test rejec-
tion regions with desirable, provable properties. A class of tests can
be constructed with a specified rate of Type-I error, the probability of
obtaining false positives, and among such a class, tests can be often
be identified with optimized power, the probability of obtaining true
positives. However, the rich and rigorous underpinnings of hypothesis
testing come at a cost. Though well-developed and widely effective,
these methods are limited in the types of conclusions they can draw
and the types of questions they can address (Spanos 2010, Burnham
and Anderson 2002).
Hypothesis testing uses known distributions to make binary deci-
sions between rejecting null and alternate hypotheses with a quantifi-
able degree of certainty. As such, test results are clear and commini-
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cable, but their implications are less so. Hypothesis testing cannot
prove that a distribution speficied by the alternative hypothesis is true;
to do so would be to commit a“fallacy of acceptance” (Spanos 2010).
The constructs of null and alternative hypotheses also do not permit
comparisons between two disparate, plausible models. This is limiting
when investigating phenomena with competing explanations. The abil-
ity to evaluate such structural explanations, and indeed to make claims
about their validity, is of central importance in fields characterized by
quantitative theory and noisy data, such as biology, psychology, and
sociology (Ullman and Bentler 2012). These shortcomings have moti-
vated the devlopment and adoption of new statistical paradigms such
as information-theoretic model selection.
There are certainly cases in which statisticans have been able to an-
alytically compute likelihood ratio distributions for non-nested models,
but this is not possible in general. As such, even these tractable cases
provide only a limited and specialized extension to the families and pairs
of distributions that characterize most of hypothesis testing. It was not
until the development of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) that
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disparate models could be compared easily and generally (Akaike 1974,
Shmueli 2010). Though derived as an estimator for a given model’s
“distance” from a true data generating process (K-L Divergence), the
AIC can be seen as a modified likelihood function that penalizes mod-
els for their intrinsic complexity (Burnham and Anderson 2010). The
AIC is widely used for selecting and constructing predictive models be-
cause its basis in information theory makes it effective at minimizing
predictive loss (Shmueli 2010). It can be used to construct weighted
averages of models which can outperform their individual components
(Burnham and Anderson 2002, Posada and Buckely 2004).
In the context of predicting new data based on past observations,
the AIC has considerable justification and proven performance (Akaike
1974). In identifying a true model from a set of candidates, it lacks
such justification. It is shown that even as sample size approaches
infinity, the the probability that the AIC identifies a true model, as-
suming the true model is in the set of candidates, does not converge to
1 in general (Bozdogan 1987). Moreover, the AIC cannot be used to
make decisions based on allowable degrees of error, the very foundation
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of classical hypothesis testing. In spite of these facts, the objections of
some statisticians, and indeed the recommendations of those who pop-
ularized its use (e.g. Burnham and Anderson 2002), the AIC is often
employed with the aim of selecting a single, correct (i.e. “true”) model
(Spanos 2010, Shmueli 2010, Bozdogan 1989). While alternatives to the
AIC have been developed, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), which does consistently identify true models (Schwarz 1978),
they still do not enable testing at specified error levels.
Information-theoretic methods remedy some of the limitations of
classical hypothesis testing at the expense of control over error rates.
In light of these discrepancies, this paper introduces a framework for
model selection with error control as well as an easy to implement
computational method which selects models with approximate error
bounds. In doing so, this paper aims to reconcile the evident needs of
statistical practitioners with the valid complaints raised against model
selection.
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2 Background
2.1 Classical Hypothesis Testing
The origins of “classical” testing in use today can be traced back to
(Fisher 1924) on “significance testing,” and a more generalized formu-
lation by (Neyman and Pearson 1933) on hypothesis testing.
(Fisher 1925) introduced the notion of statistical significance and
its use in decision-making. The text does not provide a concise, for-
mal definition of significance, but uses the term widely when describing
decision-making processes which use as evidence the probability of re-
sults being generated by a null distribution. This formulation of testing
is concerned primarily with testing the differences of sample means and
thus employs the t and z statistics stemming from the t and normal
distributions.
The test statistic is then used to generate p-values, given for example
by p = P (t > t∗|H0), the probability that a random sample from the
statistic’s associated distribution would be greater than (similarly, less
than or with absolute value greater than) the test statistic. These values
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are used in two ways in the text. (Fisher 1924) suggests that p-values
can be compared to certain benchmarks, and gives as an example the
familiar 0.05 “significance level,” though it is noted that these values
should be selected depending on the context of an experiment. In
addition to this type of decision-making, p-values are used by Fisher to
report degrees of evidence against the null hypothesis.
Neyman and Pearson (1933) introduced a refinement of this testing
procedure. Neyman-Pearson-style testing aimed to formalize Fisher’s
tests of significance in a more mathematically rigorous manner, ex-
panding the types of tests that can be performed while also restrict-
ing the ways in which results are meant to be interpreted. Neyman
and Pearson also introduced the “alternative hypothesis,” and from
the two-hypothesis formulation they introduced the concepts of Type-I
and Type-II error as well as statistical power. The fundamentals of
Neyman-Pearson testing are encoded in the Neyman Pearson lemma,
stated below.
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Neyman-Pearson Lemma: Assume X is a random sample X =
x1, x2, . . . , xn generated by a distribution parametrized by Θ. Then,
construct a likelihood ratio test with hypotheses
H0 :Θ = Θ0
Hα :Θ = Θα
and rejection region C determined by the critical value k defined by
some α ∈ [0, 1], i.e. k is a constant for which
L(θ0|X)
L(θα|X) ≤ k inside C and
P (
L(θ0|, X)
L(θα|X) ≤ k) = α for θ = θ0
Then, the Neyman-Pearson Lemma concludes that the test determined
by the rejection region C is the most powerful test for this set of hy-
potheses.
While the Neyman-Pearson lemma applies to a specific test statistic
and set of hypotheses, it was the foundation for the goal of construct-
ing tests to attain maximum power for a given α, and more broadly
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for emphasizing the relationship between error and power in testing.
Based on this emphasis, one can see how simply reporting p-values as
quantifiers of evidence can be seen as an abuse of testing (Wagenmak-
ers 2007). If a researcher desired to report results for a test with an
α level of 0.01 for instance, they should not, according to Neyman-
Pearson principles, simultaneously allow for results using an α value of
0.05. The more rigorous results stemming from a test with α = 0.01
depend not on the observed p-value, which is itself a random variable,
but on the underlying probability that the test should be accepted or
rejected. A p-value below 0.01 has different implications for α = 0.01
and α = 0.05, because the primary result according to this method of
testing should be the decision between rejecting and failing to reject
the null hypothesis.
The misuse of test results is one of several complaints raised against
hypothesis testing. The process is subject to both the “fallacy of re-
jection” and “fallacy of acceptance,” the former of which states that
failure to reject the null hypothesis can be misinterpreted as evidence in
support of it (Spanos 2010). Perhaps a more nuanced point is that the
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fallacy of acceptance describes how rejecting the null hypothesis can
be conflated with accepting the alternative hypothesis as true. This is
especially problematic for experiments comparing explanatory models
for real-world processes. Comparing explanatory models is common
practice in fields such as psychology and sociology, and in these fields
is referred to as Structural Equation Modeling (Hox and Bechger 1998,
Ullman and Bentler 2012). An NP test is useful for detecting the pres-
ence of an effect between treatments, but is not meant for conclusions
that the alternative hypothesis defines a model that contains the un-
derlying truth.
Hypothesis tests also limit the types of statistical tests that can be
performed and the types of conclusions that can be drawn. Testing be-
tween nested null and alternative models means that a practitioner can-
not easily compare the relative evidence for two disparate explanatory
models. Moreover, there are some cases in which a null model describes
a result which would be qualitatively important. One such example in
paleobiological studies of evolutionary rates and directions is noted in
(Hunt 2015). In this line of research, practitioners are particularly in-
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terested in whether fossil data exhibits evidence for evolutionary stasis,
or if it resembles a directed or undirected random walk. Hunt notes
studies which posit as null models either stasis or undirected walks. In
either of these cases, the null models describe results which would be
biologically relevant to the field.
The specification of scientifically relevant explanations as null mod-
els has led to a misuse of the hypothesis testing framework in biol-
ogy and psychology (Bausman 2018). Bausman (2018) notes that it
is common in these fields to use the more simple of two explanations
as a null hypothesis, and upon failing to reject the null hypothesis,
concludes that there is support for the null. This practice is justified
on the grounds that the more simple explanation should be used until
an explanation outperforms it, but such a justification is not rooted in
the principles which drive hypothesis testing. Instead, it results in an
”epistemological privilege” for the null model, which can lead to un-
substantiated support for the null. This misuse of hypothesis testing
points not only to a larger misunderstanding of the role of statistics
in scientific study, but to the need for statistical methods which more
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appropriately address the types of inquiry that comprise scientific prac-
tice.
These limits of hypothesis testing provide substantial motivation for
statistical methods that allow for the comparison of multiple and dis-
parate models, and with more interpretable notions of evidence in the
contexts of the experiment being performed. One such school of sta-
tistical decision-making with these motivations is based on information
criteria methods, described in the next section.
2.2 Model Selection
Akaike (1974) formally introduced “an Information Criterion,” later to
be recognized as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), as an estima-
tor of the relative expected KL Divergences among a set of statistical
models and an underlying true distribution. The AIC was groundbreak-
ing in relating KL Divergence to Fisher’s maximized likelihood to create
a simple, tractable measure of relative information loss that could be
used to compare multiple models simultaneously, as well as non-nested
models with disparate functional forms (Burnham and Anderson 2002).
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The formula for the AIC of a model gi with K parameters, given ob-
served data x = x1, x2, . . . , xn, is given by
AIC(gi|x) = −2L(gi|x) + 2K.
Because it is a function of the negative likelihood, the best AIC
score among a set of models is the minimum score. Then, the quantity
2K in the AIC function can be said to penalize a model with more pa-
rameters. The AIC is therefore useful for protecting against overfitting
models. According to the AIC, the increased likelihood from increas-
ing complexity must outweigh the penalty associated with increasing
complexity. In the context of linear regression, for example, including
an additional covariate will always decrease the error sum of squares,
and thus increase goodness-of-fit. If the additional covariates are fitting
observational error, however, predictions made using the more complex
model will be inferior to those made by the simple model. information-
theoretic methods are commonly used for selecting which variables to
use in a linear model and which to leave out.
Making accurate predictions is a key goal of statistics, and was the
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orginally intended application of the AIC (Shmueli 2010). However, the
AIC is sometimes used in other contexts, for different research goals,
and thus has different implications. It is then important to elucidate
the differences in types of statistical modeling, and of particular interest
is the difference between predictive and explanatory modeling.
Predictive and Explanatory Modeling
The AIC’s basis in information theory, and effectiveness minimizing
information loss, have made AIC-based practices popular for predictive
modeling, both for selecting a best singular model and for creating
weighted ensemble models (Shmueli 2010). However, in some scientific
fields, predicting future data can be less informative than finding a
model with an interpretable functional form (Hox 1998, Wagenmakers
2007).
Models in psychology, for example, are often used to develop the-
ories of the characteristics of human behavior. The intent of such re-
search is not to predict future human behavior, but to fit into a larger
context of psychological theory. Similarly, one could imagine a social
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scientist using census data to identify demographic factors that lead to
homelessness or poverty. Conclusions made by this research would be
used to make claims about larger sociological and economic structures.
As noted above, these examples would be referred to in these fields
as structural equation modeling, used to investigate abstract theoreti-
cal constructs which “describe a pheonomenon of theoretical interest”
(Hox 1998, Edwards and Bagozzi 2000). Because of their use in com-
municating real world structures, it is desirable for these models to
contain a relatively small number of covariates (Vandekerchkove 2015).
Such models are called parsimonious, meaning that they describe a
phenomenon with as few predictors as possible. The motivation for
parsimonious models is well summarized by Occam’s razor —given two
plausible explanations, the simpler one is usually better.
Explanatory modeling also plays a large role in the biological sci-
ences. A study in cell biology might aim to compare two possible
biological mechanisms to attain a better understanding of how cells
function (Williams 1970). Candidate models in this case would be ap-
proximations of physical or chemical processes. These models would
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have functional forms that try to adequately describe real world pro-
cesses.
Critically, explanatory models offer causal explanations as opposed
to associative relationships (Shmueli 2010). Statistical theory would
state that many testing contexts, such as observational studies, are not
amenable to making conclusions about causal relationships, but this
distinction is often ignored in scientific practice (Shmueli 2010).
As stated above, the AIC was not intended for use in explanatory
modeling, but its ease of use in comparing multiple and non-nested
models has led to its widespread application in explanatory setting
(Shmueli 2010, Ullman and Bentler 2012). A naive use of the AIC
for this application would be to select and report the model which ob-
tains the best AIC score for given data. However, to do so is to ignore
the principle of ”model selection uncertainty”, and can lead to unpre-
dictable conclusions (Wagenmakers et al. 2004). The AIC is, after all,
a modified likelihood function, and thus AIC rankings are a random
variable of the data. Thus, the observed best model can vary consid-
erably with sampling fluctuation (Preacher and Merkle 2012). The use
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of the AIC and other information-theoretic criteria requires a more nu-
anced framework than simply reporting the best model. Guidelines for
use of AIC, with an emphasis in the natural sciences, are laid out in
(Burnham and Anderson 2002) and have been widely used, if at times
misused.
Model Selection Methods
Burnham and Anderson (2002) situates model selection not as a re-
placement to classical statistical testing, but as a supplement to it,
especially for observational data and exploratory analysis. According
to Burnham and Anderson (B-A) hypothesis tests based on observa-
tional data often overlook important assumptions made for those tests,
and can often lead to a sort of “false significance.” Observational data
can contain biases due to sampling methods, and thus are not often
representative of the populations they describe. Applying N-P testing
to these data is then violating assumptions of the underlying statistical
principles (Wagenmakers 2007). Moreover, due to sampling noise, and
because of the common interpretation of p-values, exploratory analyses
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using N-P testing and p-values can easily overfit a model, for example
including erroneous variables in a linear regression analysis.
It is noted in (Burnham and Anderson 2002) that the AIC is not a
statistical test and does not entail notions of confidence or error. Thus,
the methods they provide are intended for assessing relative evidence
for each model, and not for making definitive conclusions regarding
models. The foundations of this method are as follows.
For given data X, obtain AIC scores for each model M given X.
Then, record the minimum AIC score as AICmin. Using the minimum
AIC, one computes the AIC differences ∆i,
∆i = AICi − AICmin
In the B-A paradigm, score differences allow a practitioner to appraise
the level of support for a given model as compared to the best fitting
model. The text recommends a loose set of guidelines as a tool to drive
further testing, and so do not immediately seek to discount models that
do not perform best. As such, AIC differences are compared to a table
of benchmark rules of thumb for relative evidence as follows:
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∆i Level of Empirical Support of Model i
0-2 Substantial
4-7 Considerably less
≥10 Essentially none.
Table 1: Proposed values for classifying relative support between mod-
els based on AIC differences, taken from (Burnham and Anderson 2002)
Burnham and Anderson employ AIC differences as a clear descrip-
tion of relative model fits, or in information-theoretic terms, relative
expected information loss. It should be noted that the B-A threshold
values are not selected arbitrarily, but have a further justification in
terms of each model’s likelihoods given the observed data. Burnham
and Anderson show that this conditional likelihood, denoted L(gi, x)
is proportional to the quantity exp(−12∆i). This property is then used
to describe model support in two ways: using normalized values which
are termed Akaike weights and using ratios of exp(−12∆i) for differing
models, which are termed evidence ratios.
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Akaike Weights Given observed data x and modelsM1,M2, . . . ,MR,
construct the normalized terms
wi =
exp(−12∆i)∑R
r=1 exp(−12∆r)
The interpretation of the wi is given as follows: “A given wi is consid-
ered as the weight of evidence in favor of model i being the actual K-L
best model for the situation at hand given that one of the R models
must be the K-L best model of that set of R models” (Burnham and
Anderson 2002). Under this interpretation, the Akaike weights can be
a useful tool for appraising the degree of support for the best model
as compared to the entire model set. Moreover, these weights have
been shown to be useful for constructing weighted ensemble models for
predictive modeling (Burnham and Anderson 2002, ).
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Evidence Ratios In addition to the overall weights of conditional
likelihoods, define the evidence ratios between the conditional likeli-
hoods for two given models Mi,Mj as
exp(−12∆i)
exp(−12∆j)
.
This quantity is of particular interest when model i is the model which
obtained the minimum AIC. In this case, because exp(−12∆i) = 1 for
model i, the evidence ratio is a function of ∆j. (Burnham and Ander-
son 2002) gives the following values of this function for some values of
∆j:
∆j Evidence ratio
2 2.7
4 7.4
8 54.6
10 148.4
15 1808.0
20 22026.5
Table 2: Selected AIC difference values and associated evidence ratios
from (Burnham and Anderson 2002). According to the table, if model
j has an AIC score 2 points higher than the best fitting model, its
likelihood is lower than the best model’s by a factor of 2.7.
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These evidence ratio values do not give a strict interpretation for
decision-making, but are shown in the text to illustrate the nonlinear-
ity between the score differences and the evidence ratios. It is claimed
that “this information helps to justify the rough rules of thumb given
for judging the evidence for models being the best K-L model in the
set” (Burnham and Anderson 2002).That a score difference of 10 cor-
responds to the a the best model being 148.4 greater in relative likeli-
hood than model j does provide evidence against model j. However,
the choice of the specifc cutoff points between the classifications are
not derived from any underlying principle.
The AIC was not originally developed for the sake of decisively
choosing among statistical models, and neither were the methods de-
scribed in (Burnham and Anderson 2002), which warns against the
equating of their methods to testing:
“Information-theoretic criteria such as AIC, AICc, and QAICc are not
a ‘test’ in any sense, and there are no associated concepts such as test
power or P-values or α−levels. Statistical hypothesis testing represents
a very different, and generally inferior, paradigm for the analysis of data
in complex settings. It seems best to avoid use of the word ‘significant’
in reporting research results under an information-theoretic paradigm”
(Burnham and Anderson 2002, p. 84).
That these two paradigms are different is clear; that hypothesis test-
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ing is “generally inferior,” as claimed above, is less so. Crucially, the
popular practice of information-theoretic model selection differs from
the intended use, much like the combined use of Neyman-Pearson test-
ing and Fisher’s p-values. While p-values take on the role of quantifying
evidence, as opposed to determining test outcomes, the AIC is used for
classification and selection, as opposed to quantifying evidence.
Complaints against AIC selection Insofar as information-theoretic
selection procedures are used to report a single “best” model, a prac-
tice not entirely consistent with their intended use, it has been shown
that these procedures can produce results which are less interpretable
and less reliable than results obtained from hypothesis testing. As
stated in (Spanos 2010), “Akaike-type procedures are often unreli-
able because their minimization of a normed-based function is tanta-
mount to comparisons among the models within the prespecified family
Mi(z), i = 1, 2, ...m, based on Neyman-Pearson (N-P) hypothesis test-
ing with unknown error probabilities.” Spanos presents one such ex-
ample, summarized below:
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Example: Consider the following models M1 and M2 for observed
data y1, . . . yn and predictors x1, . . . , xn, where
M1 : yi = β0 + β1xi + β2x
2
i + β3x
3
i + εi,
M2 : yi = α0 + α1xi + εt.
For the case in which the true model is M1, Spanos (2010) demonstrates
that selecting M2 based on the best AIC can be described equivalently
as a likelihood ratio test. Moreover, it is shown that the error attained
by this test varies with n. For n = 35, this test has a Type-I error rate
of α = 0.180.
This example shows a clear incompatibility between the notions
of evidence used in hypothesis-testing procedures and in information-
theoretic procedures. According to (Spanos 2010), this incompatability
is problematic in the context of a larger scientific practice. Despite this
incongruence, the benefits of AIC model selection, such as the ability
to test between multiple and non-nested models, cannot be overlooked,
especially in fields such as biology, which rely on descriptive modeling.
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A key aspect of N-P style testing is the availability of solutions to
the distribution of test statistics, made possible by the relationships
between null- and alternate distributions. Analytical solutions to dis-
tribution functions are, in general, not accessible when considering a set
of two non-nested models (Wagenmakers et al. 2004). This means, for
instance, that the construction of a likelihood ratio test with an analyt-
ically determined critical value is generally not possible. Vuong (1989)
has made use of asymptotic approximations to likelihood ratio distribu-
tions between non-nested models, but which do not allow for multiple
model comparisons. Attempts have been made to approximate these
distributions computationally, for the purpose of refining selection pro-
cedures beween non-nested models (Williams 1970, Wagenmakers et al.
2004, Preacher and Merkle 2012).
Williams (1970a) described a method in which likelihood ratios are
generated for synthetic, parametrically bootstrapped data originating
from the MLEs of each model with respect to the data. These are used
to generate approximate distributions of the LR under each assumption,
which are then used to determine critical values for making conclusions
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between the two models, given the data. Given that an LR is equivalent
to the difference of log-likelihoods, this is cited in (Wagenmakers et
al. 2004) as the first use of “Differences in Goodness-of-Fit” (DGOF)
distributions under competing assumptions of two models being the
true generating process for observed data.
Williams’ method is built upon the idea of likelihood ratio tests, but
makes a significant departure in including two competing hypotheses
as opposed to the classical null and alternative hypotheses. In short,
according to this method, a decision can be made to favor either candi-
date model, or can conclude that the models both perform too poorly
or too similarly to choose one.
The method suggested in (Williams 1970a) is developed further and
tested in (Williams 1970), using two disparate models of regression. For
observed data yi observed at time ti, the first model, referred to as the
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“Segmented Model,” is shown below:
yi = f(Θ, ti) + εi,Θ = (α, β1, β2, β3, T1, T2), where
f(Θ, t) = α + β1t for t ≤ T1
= α + β1T1 + β2(t− T1) for T1 ≤ t ≤ T2
= α + β1T1 + β2(T2 − T1) + β(t− T2) for T2 ≤ t,
and εi ∼ N(0, σ2f) and independently distributed.
The fit for this model is compared to a “Smooth Model,” given by
yi = g(Ψ, ti) + εi, Ψ = (a, b, c),
where g(Ψ, t) = a + b exp(ct) and εi ∼ N(0, σ2f) and independently
distributed.
In this experiment, the models represent differing qualitative hy-
potheses for modeling the patterns of synthesis of various enzymes in
bacterial cells. Both regression models describe patterns of synthesis
which approximate real world processes, and both models are of distinct
interest to the field of research. As such, it would be less informative to
26
perform a hypothesis test associated with either model than to compare
them outright.
The likelihood ratio λ used in this test is given by the ratio of the
residual sum of squares for the segmented model to those of the smooth
model. (Williams 1970) states that “to use this criterion knowledge is
needed of the distributions of λ under the assumption in turn that
each of the two models is true.” These distributions are dependent on
unknown model parameters, which are estimated by the MLEs of each
model, given data.
The likelihood difference distributions are approximated using para-
metric bootstrap resampling (James et al. 2013), as there is no ana-
lytical solution for them. As previously stated, the lack of solutions
for likelihood ratios of disparate distributions has prevented their use
in classical tests, so estimating them with parametric bootstrap is in-
novative. Despite an innovative sampling method, what follows in the
decision process lacks a clear statistical foundation. With regard to the
decision regions, Williams (1970) states that “no justification of this
rule in terms of misclassification probabilities is claimed, for the form
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of the distributions of the conditional likelihood ratios are not known.”
Despite its shortcomings, this method approaches a problem in sta-
tistical model selection distinct from the problem of intrinsic model
complexity. Where the AIC is used to penalize models that are more
complex in general, based on numbers of parameters, (Williams 1970)
considers models’ ability to fit data generated by other models, a prop-
erty given the term model mimicry (Wagenmakers et al. 2004).
The motivation for decision procedures that take into account model
mimicry is clear. Suppose one is comparing fits of two models, A and B,
where A is relatively inflexible and unable to fit data from B, but B is
able to fit well to data generated by A. Even if A has more parameters,
and thus more complexity according to the AIC, this complexity does
not lead to increased GOF in the case where B is true.
Wagenmakers et al. (2004) Wagenmakers et al. (2004) also uses
a bootstrap procedure to estimate distributions of relative goodness
of fit functions for model selection. The text describes these distri-
butions as “Difference in Goodness of Fit” distributions, which use
log-likelihoods (or in this case, AIC scores) to convert the likelihood
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ratio into a difference. In AIC-based selection between two non-nested
models, model mimicry can lead to unequal misclassification probabil-
ities. It is claimed that if these probabilities are mismatched, e.g. if
data generated from model A is more likely to be attributed to model
B than vice versa, the procedure exhibits a type of bias toward model
B.
To combat this phenomenon, Wagenmakers’ procedure uses approx-
imate DGOF distributions to move the decision criterion away from
zero (i.e. simply choosing the best fitting model) and to a point “that
maximizes the probability of a correct binary classification.” This pro-
cedure is outlined below:
For two models A and B and observed data X, estimated param-
eters and goodness-of-fit values are obtained for each model based on
X. This gives fitted parameter values ΘˆA and ΘˆB for models A and
B, and an observed difference in goodness-of-fit ∆GOFAB given by
GOFA −GOFB.
Under competing assumptions that each model is true, approximate
distributions (∆GOF ∗AB|A is true) and (∆GOF ∗AB|B is true) are com-
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puted via bootstrap. The densities of these distributions are denoted by
PA(x) and PB(x), respectively. Then, an observed ∆GOFAB is more
likely to have come from the assumption that model A is true when
PA(x)/PB(x) > 1 for x = ∆GOFAB.
From PA(x) and PB(x), (Wagenmakers et al. 2004) constructs a
decision criterion which differs from the usual interpretation of the AIC,
in which the best model is that which obtains the lowest score. In this
procedure, the decision criterion is set to the point denoted (opt) at
which PA(x)/PB(x) = 1. The relationships between the distributions
and the decision criterion is best depicted graphically:
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Figure 1: Model Mimicry: example DGOF distributions conditional on
the true model. A line has been drawn at −1.5, marking the optimized
decision threshold between the two models.
In the plot above, the two density curves intersect at the value
∆GOFAB = −1.5. This represents a case in which model A exhibits
greater mimicry than model B. The distribution for ∆GOFAB|B is true
has a mean value closer to zero compared to the mean of the distribution
of ∆GOFAB|A is true. This means model A is observed best more often
when B is true than vice versa. Thus, the decision threshold (opt) =
-1.5 gives equal classification error, while a threshold of 0 would result
in greater error in the case that model A is true.
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Wagenmakers’ procedure differs from Williams’ in two critical ways.
Firstly, it relates the decision criterion to misclassification error, which
was thought to be inaccessible to Williams. However, the Wagenmak-
ers procedure has only two possible decisions: a conclusion in favor of
each model. Thus, Wagenmakers’ procedure serves only to optimize
decision-making within the current standard of AIC-based model se-
lection. It falls short of addressing complaints leveraged against model
selection such as those in (Spanos 2010): that model selection amounts
to statistical testing with undefined and unmeasured degrees of error.
This paper aims to adapt and extend ideas from (Williams 1970)
and (Wagenmakers et al. 2004) to define a model selection procedure
driven by the notion of error control. This will involve defining a gen-
eral, functional framework for decision-making in model selection that
permits notions of Type-I and Type-II error, as well as a theoretical
procedure which uses conditional DGOF distributions to bound Type-I
error. I will then present a bootstrap method for approximating the
necessary functions for the decision procedure along with results on
simulated i.i.d. and time series data.
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3 A Framework for Model Selection
Toward a Translatable Standard of Evidence Motivated by the
gap in evidence between classical hypothesis testing and model selec-
tion, as well as the increased generality and flexibility of information-
theoretic model selection, we aim to develop a procedure by which
model selection can be performed with a standard of evidence com-
parable to that of hypothesis testing. In particular, we will define a
general theoretical framework for model selection which allows us to ex-
tend the notions of Type-I and Type-II Errors to information-theoretic
procedures. Moreover, we will propose and demonstrate a procedure
which uses this framework to perform AIC model selection with speci-
fied maximum Type-I error rate α.
Given dataD ∈ D and candidate model setM = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mk},
specify
1. A criterion function f : M× D → R, which assigns a score to
each model Mi based on the observed data.
• Let F denote the vector of criterion values = (f(Mi, D) :
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i = 1, . . . , k
)
.
2. A preference function g : Rk → M, which selects a best model
from the candidate model set given the model score vector.
• For observed F as above, let Mb = g(F ). In other words,
denote the best model according to g by Mb.
3. A decision function h : M× Rk → {0, 1}, which is equal to 1 if
the specified model is chosen to be correct, and 0 otherwise.
• Generally, we will take h(Mi, ·) = 0 when i 6= b. This means
that in general, only the observed best model can be chosen
as correct.
3.1 Example: Simple AIC-based selection
This model selection framework permits a standard use of the AIC
for selecting a correct model according to best-fit. For data D and
candidate model set M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mk}, define
1. f(M,D) = AIC(M,D) = 2k− 2Lˆ(M ;D), where k is the number
of parameters for M and Lˆ(M ;D) is log-likelihood evaluated at
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the maximum likelihood estimator.
2. g(F (D)) = arg minM(F (D)). Here we report the model with the
lowest AIC as best.
3. h(Mb, ·) = 1. The observed best model is automatically reported
to be correct.
3.2 Example: Changing the Decision Function
Reporting the best-fitting model as correct can lead to a high rate of
misclassification error, a commonly raised complaint against information-
theoretic selection methods (Spanos 2010). With this in mind, many
have specified rules-of-thumb for quantifying evidence in support of the
best model (Burnham and Anderson 2003). In the case of Burnham and
Anderson, alternative models are said to attain relatively no support
given data compared to the best model when they attain AIC scores at
least 10 points above that of the best model.
Along these lines, we can encode a decision function which reports
the best model as correct if its score is at least 10 points less than all
other model scores. We define the criterion and preference functions as
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above. Letting Mb be the model which attains the best AIC score, as
above, define
∆f = Fb −min{Fi : i 6= b}
but now define the decision function as follows.
h(Mb, F (D)) =

1 if ∆f < −10
0 otherwise
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4 Error Rates and the Confusion Matrix
In adapting error rates to a general information-theoretic model selec-
tion context, we must consider what constitutes a Type I or Type II
error. These terms typically refer to conclusions about the null hypoth-
esis in classical hypothesis testing, while our framework doesn’t include
the specification of a null model. As such, there is no null hypothe-
sis to be rejected, but rather the difference is between selecting or not
selecting one of the candidate models as correct.
When performing error controlled model selection, we assume that
the model set contains the true generating process for the data. Under
this assumption, we can define errors based on reporting a false model
as correct or on failing to identify the true model. The latter case
is more complex, and to examine it further we consider the possible
outcomes of the model selection procedure. Suppose that among the
model set M = {M1, . . . ,Mp} and for some t ∈ {1, . . . , p}, model Mt
is the true generating process. Then according to our framework, the
possible outcomes for the preference and decision functions are
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1. Mb = Mt & h(Mb, F (D)) = 1 : The true model is observed best,
and we conclude that it is correct. This is a “true positive.”
2. Mb 6= Mt & h(Mb, F (D)) = 1 : An incorrect model is observed
best, and we conclude that it is correct. This is a “false positive.”
3. Mb = Mt & h(Mb, F (D)) = 0 : The true model is observed best,
and we fail to conclude it is correct. This is a “false negative.”
4. Mb 6= Mt & h(Mb, F (D)) = 0 : An incorrect model is observed
best, and we fail to conclude it is correct. This is a “true nega-
tive.”
In separating cases three and four, we recognize case three as a
shortcoming of the error control process and case four as a feature. We
say that a Type II error occurs under case three, but not case four.
To evaluate and compare decision procedures we consider their Type
I error rates as well as their sensitivity, given by the ratio of the num-
ber of true positives to the number of true positives and false negatives.
Thus, a decision function in which the output of the preference function
is always reported (e.g. always choosing the model with the best AIC),
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the sensitivity is 100%, but there is no control on the error rate. Sensi-
tivity leads to a salient interpretation of the amount of signal lost due
to error control, and also could be used to compare decision procedures
across multiple score and preference functions.
The Confusion Matrix Suppose that we have p different mod-
els. We define the confusion matrix M to be the p × p matrix where
each element Mij corresponds to the probability of reporting model Mi
as true when Mj is the true model. The elements of the confusion
matrix are given by
Mij = p(M |Tj = 1)p(h = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1) (1)
The term p(B = i|Tj = 1) is the probability that model i will be
chosen as best while assuming that model j is the true generating mech-
anism. The term p(h = 1|Mj, B = i) is the probability of obtaining a
decision that model i is correct, assuming that model j is true.
Thus, for i = j, i.e. the diagonal elements of M describe the proba-
bility of recovering the true model, given the data. The elements where
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i 6= j describe the probability of false positives, i.e. for concluding that
model i is true when the data was actually generated by model j.
Thus, if we have models M1, . . . ,Mp, with true model MT , the value
MTT gives the power of the test, and the value Mij gives the probability
of committing a Type-I error under the condition that Mi is observed
best and Mj is the true distribution.
The advantage of situating model selection within our general frame-
work, i.e. using preference and decision functions, is that it gives us
a means of comparing model selection procedures similarly to how we
compare statistical tests. For instance, since we can define the type I
error rate α, we might approach the choice of a model selection proce-
dure similarly to identifying a uniformly most powerful statistical test
—by choosing an acceptable error rate and then seeking to maximize
statistical power.
This thesis defines a class of decision functions hτ motivated by the
elements of the confusion matrix and a bootstrap-based approach for
estimating the tuning parameter τ to bound the error rate at a specified
value. In doing so, we hope to work toward facilitating the translation
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or comparison between standards of evidence for model selection.
5 A Class of Decision Functions hτ
Recall that the element Mij of confusion matrix M is given by Mij =
p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1)p(h = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1).
A decision function with error rate α would output h = 1 in such a
manner that all Mij = p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1)p(h = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1) = α for
i 6= j, j = t. Note that the probability term p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1) does not
depend on the choice of h. Suppose that for a given experiment, model
Mj is the true model, and model Mi is observed best. Suppose further
that we could compute the true value of p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1). Then,
suppose that for a given τ ∈ [0, 1], we could define a function hτ such
that the event (hτ(. . . ) = 1|Bi = 1|Tj = 1) occurs with probability τ .
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Then, for α ∈ [0, 1], define α′ = αp(Bi=1,Tj=1) . Then, let τ = α′ we have
Mij = p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1)p(hα′ = 1|Bi = 1|Tj = 1)
= p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1) α
p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1)
= α
Toward a tractable form of hτ We have specified a class of func-
tions of the form hτ such that given models Mi and Mj, score function
f , and preference function g, P (hτ = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1) = τ . Suppose
that f was the AIC and g selected the model with the lowest AIC.
Then, to approach an hτ which relates to the probability that model
Mi is chosen as best when model Mj is the true generating mechanism,
we consider the statistic
∆AICi = AIC(D,Mi)−min{AIC(D,Mj)}i 6=j,
which gives the difference between the AIC for the first- and second-
ranked models. Recall that this statistic is used by Burnham and An-
derson to describe evidence in support of the observed best model based
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on rules-of-thumb, e.g. report the best model if ∆AICi < 10. Instead
of using a preordained value, suppose instead that we could access the
conditional distribution of (∆AICi|Bi = 1, Tj = 1). For τ ∈ [0, 1],
define qτ to be the τth percentile of this distribution. Then, define hτ
to be
hτ =

1 if ∆AICi < qτ
0 otherwise
By definition of percentile, P (hτ = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1) = τ . Thus,
supposing we can access the distribution of (∆AICi|Bi = 1, Tj = 1),
we can define a function hτ that attains type-I error rate of p(Bi =
1|Tj = 1)p(h = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1) = α by setting τ = α′. Note that τ
varies with ij, i.e. that each pair of models will have a different decision
function with differing thresholds, but indices are suppressed here for
convenient notation.
In practice, we do not have access to the threshold values qτ , because
we do not have advance solutions for the probabilities p(Bi = 1|Tj =
1) or the conditional distributions of (∆AICi = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1).
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We cannot generally expect to find analytic solutions based on the
distributions of the models and the functions used in the model selection
procedure. This issue is prevalent in model selection - the flexibility
afforded in comparing multiple and non-nested models using e.g. the
AIC comes at a cost.
In light of the unavailability of analytic solutions, we opt for com-
putational methods to estimate the necessary components to produce
approximate functions hˆτ for hτ . However, the parametric bootstrap
has been shown to be effective in estimating quantiles (Falk 1989), and
my method will make use of this parametric resampling to construct
approximate DGOF distributions to estimate quantiles.
6 BITSEC - A Bootstrap Procedure for
Approximating the Decision Function
As above, suppose that we have data D, candidate model set M =
{M1, . . . ,Mp}, and true model Mt ∈ M. Moreover, assume we have
chosen a score function f and a preference function g. Given a de-
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sired Type I error rate α, I introduce a bootstrap method, abbrevi-
ated BITSEC (Bootstraped Information-Theoretic Selection with Error
Control), which implements a decision function hˆ with estimated error
rate αˆ.
Given the data, the model set, and the score and preference func-
tions, we are able to determine the best performing model with respect
to the preference function. This gives us Bk = 1, i.e. that model Mk is
the observed best. At this point, we now seek to estimate α′ and use
it to estimate hα′
Estimating p(Bi = 1|Tj = 1) We use parametric bootstrap sam-
pling to estimate the probabilities p(Bi = k|Tj = 1) for each j 6= k:
Let Mˆj be the maximum likelihood estimated fit of model Mj. For
each j 6= k, generate N1 new datasets from Mˆj and record the frequency
with which Mk is observed best. This is an estimate of p(Bi = k|Tj = 1)
because it assumes that the data was generated by Mj and uses the
MLE Mˆj as the estimated true distribution corresponding to model
Mj.
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Specifying the Decision Function As previously mentioned, we
now seek a function h which, conditioning on Bk = 1 and Tj = 1, is
equal to 1 with probability αP (Bk=1|Tj=1) . To do so, we first record the
observed score delta for the experiment:
∆AIC = AIC(Mk)−min{AIC(Mj)}j 6=k
To use this value as the basis for our decision function, we use a para-
metric bootstrap to estimate the conditional distribution ∆AIC|Tj = 1.
After fitting the model Mj, we parametrically sample from it to create
N new datasets of length n, each of which gives Bi = 1. We compute
the score differences ∆∗1, . . . ,∆
∗
N . Finally, we select the order statistic
∆∗(k) where k is the largest integer in 1, . . . , N for which k/N ≤ α′. For
example, with N = 1000 and α′ = 0.1525, we select ∆∗(152) to approxi-
mate the α′ percentile. Define the quantity qˆj = ∆∗(k). We perform this
sampling and threshold estimation for each candidate model Mj and
obtain qj for all j 6= i.
Finally, we have a set of threshold values {qj}j 6=i corresponding to
conditional probabilities of observing various differences in AIC scores.
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We use these analogously to critical values in a hypothesis test. For
instance, because the threshold {qj} approximates the α percentile of
the distribution of (∆AIC|Bi = 1, Tj = 1), if the observed score dif-
ference ∆AICobs < qj, then there is less than an α percent probability
that ∆AICobs could have occurred under the assumption that model
Mj was true.
Multiple Decision Thresholds Because the BITSEC procedure
has been designed with the preference of obtaining an error rate less
than α, we take the minimum of all τα′ values as the decision thresh-
old that the observed score difference is compared to. An alternative
to choosing the minimum threshold might be choosing between the
thresholds randomly, but this would result in cases for which too lax
of a threshold is used for the decision. This procedure may be more
appropriate in cases where data is assumed to come from a mixture of
true generating distributions.
As such, we set h = 1 when ∆AICobs ≤ min{qj}j 6=k. This means
that we only accept the observed score difference ∆AICobs if it is suf-
ficiently unlikely to have come from any of the alternate assumptions
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of models Mj, being true, j 6= i. Thus we have approximated a deci-
sion function with an estimated maximum Type I error rate αˆ. Shown
below is a visualization of two distributions of ∆AIC|Tj = 1 and the
associated α = 0.05 decision thresholds. In this example, the model
M3 has been observed best, so thresholds are computed under the as-
sumptions T1 = 1 and T2 = 1. The leftmost threshold value of −5.48
is used for the procedure’s decision. Also shown below is a flow chart
summarizing the entire BITSEC procedure.
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Figure 2: Error Control: Conditional DGOF distributions and α level
thresholds. Model M3 has been observed best, and thresholds are com-
puted for the assumptions that each of the other two models is true.
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Data
MLEs
Bias Corrected MLEs
Observed Scores
Best Model Bi = 1
pij = Pij(Bi = 1|Tj = 1)
α′ij =
α
p1ij
τij ∈ [0, 1] such that P (hτij = 1|Bi = 1, Tj = 1)
h = 1 if ∆AICobs < min(τij)
Figure 3: The full BITSEC procedure: First, MLEs are fit to the
observed data, resulting in observed scores and observed best model.
Then, a bias correction is performed on the parameter estimates, and
the new values are used to estimate the probabilities Pij(Bi = 1|Tj = 1.
These probabilites are used to determine the proper quantile of the
DGOF distribution which will be approximated by the bootstrap to
give a decision threshold. After performing this step for all models other
than the observed best, the minimum threshold is taken and compared
to the observed score differnce. If the observed score is less than the
given threshold, the best model is declared to be correct. Otherwise a
“null decision” is given.
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7 Results
7.1 Bias in MLEs
Our model selection procedure depends on parametrically sampling
from the MLE for the observed data to estimate the conditional proba-
bility of each model attaining the lowest AIC score as well as the score
difference distributions which determine the decision thresholds. For
the model N(µ, σ), the MLE given by µˆ = µˆ, σˆ = s is unbiased overall,
but loses this property when conditioning on the observed best model,
which the BITSEC procedure cannot avoid.
Example For the case in which the candidate model set is N0 =
N(0, 1), N1 = N(µ, 1), N2 = N(µ, σ), consider the effect of conditioning
on N0 attaining the best AIC score. It is clear to see that B0 = 1 occurs
for samples in which µˆ and σˆ are suitably close to 0 and 1 respectively.
As such, we can see how the average MLE, conditional on N0, denoted
by (µˆ, σˆ)|B0 = 1, will be biased toward (0, 1). Shown below are the
results of conditioning on each of the three models, where the MLE’s
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shown are averaged over 10,000 runs.
B0 = 1 B1 = 1 B2 = 1
Parameter µˆ σˆ µˆ σˆ µˆ σˆ
n = 25 0.08169 1.0777 0.4104 1.0603 0.2671 1.2882
n = 50 0.07806 1.0749 0.3258 1.0560 0.2425 1.2342
n = 100 0.0688 1.0659 0.2617 1.0502 0.2225 1.1790
Table 3: Estimation of (µ, σ), true values = (0.214, 1.124) when sam-
pling from N(µ, σ) and conditioning on the observed best model under
the AIC. These parameter values have been selected such that each
model attains the best AIC with nearly equal probability when n = 50,
It should be noted that as the amount of data increases, the effects
of conditioning are different among the different models. We see that
the conditional MLEs for (µ, σ) get closer to the true parameter values
when B1 = 1 or B2 = 1, but farther away when B0 = 1. This stands to
reason because with more data, the parametric models continue to fit
the data better while the fixed model stays the same. Moreover, as the
amount of data increases, the penalty for complexity plays less of a role
in choosing the best model. As such, we observe that the data must
give an MLE increasingly close to (µ, σ) = (0, 1) for N0 to be observed
best.
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The effects of conditioning on observed best model and of increasing
sample size are summarized below. For N = 1000 samples at each size
of n = 25, 50, 100, observed parameter estimates are recorded and coded
by the best observed model. The bottom-right plot shows the trends
displayed by the mean MLEs after conditioning on each model.
Figure 4: Visualizations of classifiaction regions as a function of sample
size, true model N2 with (µ, σ) = (0.214, 1.124) Bottom left: mean pa-
rameter estimates conditional on the observed best model as a function
of sample size. Parameter estimates for N1 and N2 improve, while those
for N0 worsen.
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7.2 Bias Correction
To combat the effect of the bias on the MLEs resulting from condition-
ing on Bi = 1, we estimate the conditioning affect and correct for it.
The bias correction procedure proceeds as follows:
• Observe Bi = 1 and the MLE Θˆ
• Parametrically sample ~X∗1 , . . . ~X∗N from the assumed true model
Mj(Θˆ), where Bi = 1 for each X
∗
k .
• Obtain Θˆ∗1, . . . , Θˆ∗N from the simulated data, compute
Θˆ′ = mean (Θ1∗, . . . , Θˆ∗N).
• Estimate bias B using Bˆ = Θˆ−Θ
• Corrected estimate of Θ is given by ΘˆC = Θ− Bˆ
In general we cannot assume that Bˆ = B, but the bias correction results
in estimated parameter values that are closer to the true parameters,
which results in better downstream estimates in the model selection
procedure.
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Example Once again we consider the candidate models N0, N1, N2
with true model N2 = N(µ, σ). Shown below are corrected estimates
of µ, σ when Bi = 1.
B0 = 1 B1 = 1 B2 = 1
Parameter µˆ s µˆ s µˆ s
n = 25 0.134 1.118 0.323 1.098 0.251 1.200
n = 50 0.117 1.101 0.270 1.086 0.230 1.177
n = 100 0.110 1.093 0.236 1.076 0.219 1.144
Table 4: Bias corrected estimates of (µ, σ), true values = (0.214, 1.124),
when sampling from N(µ, σ) and conditioning on the observed best
model under the AIC.
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Figure 5: Plots of the absolute value of the bias when estimating (µ, σ),
given that each model is true. In every case, the bias correction method
reduces the bias.
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8 Results
8.1 3 Nested Normal Models
Finally, we test the full selection procedure using N2 as the true model,
with (µ, σ) = (0.214, 1.124), across α = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and n = 25, 50, 100.
The values for (µ, σ) have been selected attain nearly equal probability
for each model being observed best when n = 50. Equal selection prob-
abilities pose a considerable problem in model selection, and provide
an opportunity to demonstrate the potential strengths of BITSEC. To
attain approximate error rates, we use the proportion of decisions ob-
tained from running the procedure 1000 times on simulated data, and
perform this simulation multiple times to obtain an average error rate.
We compare these proportions to those obtained by selecting the model
with the best AIC or using Burnham and Anderson’s decision threshold
of 10.
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N0 N1 N2 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
n = 25
Best AIC 499 313 188 0 0.812 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 3 997 0 0.016
Error Controlled 0 5 28 967 0.005 0.149
n = 50
Best AIC 343 336 321 0 0.679 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 10 990 0 0.031
Error Controlled 1 3 74 922 0.004 0.231
n = 100
Best AIC 143 331 526 0 0.474 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 29 971 0 0.055
Error Controlled 1 4 162 833 0.005 0.308
N0 N1 N2 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
n = 25
Best AIC 512 285 203 0 0.797 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 2 998 0 0.001
Error Controlled 25 15 117 843 0.04 0.576
n = 50
Best AIC 349 328 323 0 0.677 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 9 991 0 .028
Error Controlled 22 24 200 754 0.046 0.619
n = 100
Best AIC 136 308 556 0 0.444 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 37 963 0 .067
Error Controlled 3 13 388 596 .026 0.698
N0 N1 N2 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
n = 25
Best AIC 513 289 198 0 0.802 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 1 999 0 0.005
Error Controlled 51 53 173 717 0.11 0.874
n = 50
Best AIC 351 351 298 0 .702 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 9 991 0 0.009
Error Controlled 25 59 258 658 0.084 0.866
n = 100
Best AIC 130 342 528 0 0.472 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 44 956 0 .009
Error Controlled 10 49 473 468 .059 0.896
Table 5: Results: Error and Sensitivity, Normal Models
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As we predicted above, the observed error rates decrease well below
α as n increases due to increased bias in the conditional MLEs, and thus
in the estimates of α′. While an improved bias correction to the MLEs
could result in an improved estimator for α′, we note that increasing
n still results in increased sensitivity, from which we conclude that the
procedure continues to improve with increased data.
8.2 Random Walks
Earlier in this paper I mentioned the question of comparing rates and
modes of evolution in fossil data, a problem described in Hunt (2015).
One question of interest is in distinguishing between data depicting
stasis and data depicting unbiased or biased random walks. This line of
questioning is not suited to hypothesis testing, because the indication of
any model as correct would be have a relevant biological interpretation.
However, stasis has been commonly used as a null model, and has been
used in the manner of accepting the null model when failing to reject
it (Hunt 2015, Bausman 2018).
This experiment uses the model set M = {M1,M2,M3}, where
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M1 denotes stasis, M2 denotes an undirected random walk, and M3
denotes a directed random walk. The stasis model is given by N(µ, σ),
and the random walk models are given as follows: for observation yt
and predictor variable xt taken at time t, yt is given by
yt = β0 + yt−1 + εt,
with the εts independently distributed as N(0, σ) and β0 = 0 for the
undirected random walk.
Using data generated by true model M3 parametrized by β0 =
0.1, σ = 1.1, chosen to assign the best AIC to M2 with much greater
frequency than M3, sample sizes n = 15 and confidence levels α =
0.01, 0.05, 0.10, shown below is a summary of error rates and sensi-
tivities using basic AIC model selection, the Burnham and Anderson
threshold of a score difference less than −10, and the BITSEC proce-
dure:
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M1 M2 M3 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
Best AIC 2 737 261 0 0.739 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 0 1000 0 0
BITSEC (α = 0.01) 0 12 32 717 0.012 0.123
BITSEC (α = 0.05) 0 48 129 717 0.048 0.494
BITSEC (α = 0.1) 1 94 169 717 0.095 0.643
Table 6: Simulation results for random walk models with true model
M3 with parametrized by β0 = 0.1, σ = 1.1
8.3 Nested Linear Regression Models
(Spanos 2010) raises an example for which the simple AIC procedure
can be represented as a hypothesis test, one with an implicit Type-I
error rate of 0.180. Not only is this error rate relatively high compared
to typical benchmarks, but is dependent on the amount of data in
the test. In this section we apply the error controlled model selection
method to the models used in this example.
Let M be the candidate model set M = M1,M2, with
M1 : yt = β0 + β1xt + β2x
2
t + β3x
3
t + εt,
M2 : yt = α0 + α1x1 + εt
and suppose that data X = x1, x2, . . . , x35 is generated from M2, with
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parameters
a0 = 167.115
a1 = 1.907
σ = 1.77
as presented in Spanos (2010) and originally seen in Spanos (2000).
We simulate 1000 datasets from the true distribution and apply the
error controlled selection method with α = 0.05. A table of decisions
is shown below:
M1 M2 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
n = 25
Best AIC 166 834 0 0.166 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 1000 0 0
Error Controlled 44 82 874 0.044 0.098
Table 7: Simulation results for nested linear regression models with
true model M2 and α = 0.05.
Thus, using the error controlled procedure, we conclude the exper-
iment in Spanos (2010) can be performed successfully with an approx-
imate maximum error rate of α = 0.05. The sensitivity of this test
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is considerably low, which attests to the difficulty in discriminating
between these two models.
8.4 Nonlinear Nonnested Regression Models
We compare the AIC model selection methods to simplified versions
of the models described in (Williams 1970). These models have been
simplified for ease of computation, as the goal of the experiment was
to assess how the procedures perform in choosing between the differing
functional forms of the models. Thus, the breakpoints in the piece-
wise model were assumed to be known, as was the term inside the
exponential function in the smooth model. This allowed for fitting the
piecewise model without considering all breakpoints, and linearized the
smooth model. The models are given as follows, where M1 denotes the
segmented model and M2 denotes the smooth model.
yi = α + β1t for t ≤ 10
= α + 10β1 + β2(t− 10) for 10 ≤ t ≤ 20
= α + 10β1 + 10β2 + β(t− 20) for 20 ≤ t,
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and εi ∼ N(0, σ2f) and independently distributed. Then, the smooth
model is given by
yi = a+ b exp(0.2t) + εi
with εi ∼ N(0, σ2f) and independently distributed. Data of sample size
n = 25 was sampled from M2 with parameters chosen such that the
correct model was selected by the AIC with approximate probability
0.80. As in previous experiments, a simulation was performed on 1000
samples from the true distribution to obtain approximate decision fre-
quencies for specified error rate α = 0.05, summarized below:
M1 M2 No Decision Total Error Sensitivity
n = 25
Best AIC 198 802 0 0.198 1
∆ = −10 Rule 0 0 1000 0 0
Error Controlled 53 446 501 0.053 0.556
Table 8: Simulation results for nonnested regression models, α = 0.05
As expected, the true model is identified by the AIC approximately
80% of the time. The rule of thumb method fails to choose a model in al-
most every run. The attained error rate for α = 0.05 was slightly above
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the desired α. This experiment may have benefitted from improved pa-
rameter estimation or an increased number of bootstrap samples, but
the results still corroborate the notion that error can be controlled in
a setting such as the one specified in (Williams 1970).
8.5 Summarized Results
In the experiments presented above, common AIC-based methods pro-
vided unpredictable results for explanatory modeling, and lead to con-
clusions without a clear degree of confidence. In particular, reporting
the observed best model as correct leads in all cases to high degrees of
Type-I error, and reporting a model based on the rule of thumb from
(Burnham and Anderson 2002) leads in all cases to poor performance
in terms of sensitivity. Either choice of fixed decision thresholds ignores
the fact that AIC differences lack a uniform scale across different ex-
periments and model sets. Thus, along with undesirable performance
in terms of error and sensitivity, the standard of evidence employed by
these methods is inconsistent among different statistical contexts.
The error controlled method introduced in this paper improves upon
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the constant threshold methods in all of the cases shown. Across many
types of data and models, the method succeeded in setting approximate
error bounds and achieving relatively high degrees of sensitivity. More-
over, sensitivity is seen to increase as the allowable error rate increases
and as the amount of data increases. By reducing model selection un-
certainty, this method leads to a standard of evidence better suited to
descriptive modeling and causal inference. This is especially useful in
applications to natural sciences, where model selection is already widely
employed.
The analyses given above were performed using an R package de-
veloped as part of this paper. The ICError package is currently under-
going error handling and documentation and will be released for public
use.
9 Software Package
As part of this paper I developed an R package which provides simple
functions for implementing the BITSEC procedure. It contains func-
tions for generating data, estimating parameters, and computing AIC
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scores for specified models. Familiar models and families of models
are supported, including linear regression models, nonlinear regression
models using the nonlinear least squares package nls, segmented regres-
sion using the segmented package, random walks, as well as standard
distributions. The package will be extended to support users with mod-
els that are not included, by letting users specify generating, fitting, and
scoring functions as needed.
In developing and improving the BITSEC functions, I took many
steps to improve runtime. The package has an option for parallel pro-
cessing, which can greatly improve speed relative to the number of cores
on the user’s computer. The package also heavily implements vectorized
functions such as apply as opposed to iterative loops, which conserve
memory and greatly decrease runtime. Moreover, for models whose
MLEs or score functions have analytic solutions, direct computations
are used whenever possible. For instance, when obtaining scores for
linear regression models, sums-of-squares are computed using matrix
forms instead of referencing R’s lm package.
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10 Discussion
Despite its original intention of predictive modeling, the AIC is widely
used in many scientific fields for explanatory modeling and structural
equation modeling (Shmueli 2010). As a result, the validity and in-
terpretation of these results has been contested (Spanos 2010). Even
though commonly acknowledged rules of thumb for safeguarding against
choosing between highly competitive models, the constant values used
in these rules lead to unpredictable results, because pairwise score dif-
ferene distributions vary greatly based on the the choice of models as
well as the true data generating process. This is clear for the rule of
adopting the model with the minimum AIC as well as using the (Burn-
ham and Anderson 2002) recommended threshold of −10, as evidenced
by (Spanos 2010) and the results of this paper. The use of these con-
stant rules, then, creates a non-uniform standard of evidence across the
practice of information-theoretic model selection. Moreover, this non-
uniformity, as well as the statistical justifications for model selection as
compared to those for hypothesis testing, lead to a discrepancy in the
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implications of the results of these methods.
Attempts have been made to improve model selection by computa-
tionally estimating distributions of differences of model scores (Williams
1973, Wagenmakers et al. 2004). However, in (Williams 1973), the
resulting estimates of difference distributions were not used in a princi-
pled manner, leading to an ambiguous interpretation of results of this
method. The basis for setting decision thresholds in (Wagenmakers et
al. 2004) claims to achieve equal error rates between two models, but it
should be noted that the method in this paper actually stems from sta-
tistical classification instead of testing. While optimizing a confusion
matrix in classification settings is a relevant problem, an underlying
assumption in this context is that observed data is drawn from dif-
fering sub-populations, i.e. has been generating by differing processes
(James, Witten, Hastie, and Tibshirani 2013). The experiment per-
formed in (Wagenmakers et al. 2004) sought to compare competing
theories of perception, results which would be generalized to the entire
population. Using classification principles in this context has, at best,
unclear motivation, and at worst questionable validity and interpreta-
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tion.
This paper has presented a general framework for model selection
with notions of Type-I and Type-II error, and thus for selecting deci-
sion functions based on controlling error. These decision functions may
be compared using statistical sensitivity, which factors out the error
inherent in the score function in the procedure. Moreover, a bootstrap
implementation of a decision function with approximate maximum er-
ror rate α) has been introduced and demonstrated on multiple use cases
and data types. It was seen in these experiments that the desired error
rate was approximately obtained in all cases, and that when fixing α,
the decision function has the desirable property of increased sensitivity
as sample size increases. A demonstrable, easy to implement method
for error controlled model selection has wide application in the natu-
ral sciences, and provides an opportunity for reexamining past studies
under a new standard of evidence.
Following the results of the error controlled model selection pro-
cedure, one is motivated to examine the individual elements of the
procedure. The general model selection framework gives the benefit of
69
distinctly separate steps which can be substituted in a modular fashion.
Alternative Score Criteria While the BITSEC has employed the
AIC, there are a number of information criteria available for use that,
depending on context, possess desirable properties as compared to the
AIC. For instance, there exists a modified AIC intended for small sam-
ple sizes (AICc). In addition, one might consider the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC), which adjusts its complexity penalty with sample
size, or the Extended Information Criterion (EIC), which estimates a
complexity penalty through the use of the bootstrap. More work is
needed for comparing the relative merit of these criteria with respect
to the error controlled framework, and they are likely dependent on the
models and sample size used in an experiment.
Parameter Estimation The use of parametric bootstrap for resam-
pling data allows for easy application to non i.i.d. data, but relies on
estimated model parameters that have been shown to be biased by con-
ditioning on the observed best fitting model. While a method for reduc-
ing this bias has been implemented, it was not shown or demonstrated
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to remove bias completely. This indicates future work in improved
parameter estimation in the model selection context. The problem of
parameter estimation is not restricted to this application however. It
should be noted that practitioners of model selection often wish to
report not only the correct model, but approximate parameters corre-
sponding to a real-world process. Thus, if these estimates are biased
by observing a model as best, theoretical conclusions drawn from them
can be inaccurate. Even if a score criterion can be shown to asymp-
totically attain a 100% probability of selecting the true model, bias in
finite samples carries strong implications, especially for fields such as
paleobiology in which research depends on small populations.
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Smoothing the Bootstrap The bootstrap method used by BIT-
SEC gives an empirical distribution as an approximation of the true
distribution. Methods have been shown for fitting a curve to this dis-
crete distrubtion, giving a smoothed bootstrap (Efron 1979, Silverman
1987). The relative efficiency of nonsmoothed and smoothed bootstrap
estimates of quantile functions is examined in (Falk and Reiss 1989).
Conclusion While improvements could potentially be made to the
BITSEC procedure, the results in this paper suggest that achieving er-
ror controlled model selection is plausible, a goal which would be appli-
cable to many scientific fields. The principles behind an error controlled
framework improve the standard of evidence, and thus strengthen the
conclusions drawn from the results of model selection analyses. Be-
cause the BITSEC procedure is designed in a flexible, computational
manner and can be implemented through an R package, it has an ease-
of-use which lends itself to being adopted by scientists and statistical
practitioners. Thus, a transition to error controlled model selection for
explanatory and structural equation modeling is not only desirable, but
plausibly attainable.
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